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Abstract
Online auctions are highly susceptible to fraud.
Shill bidding is where a seller introduces fake bids into
an auction to drive up the final price. If the shill
bidders are not detected in run-time, innocent bidders
will have already been cheated by the time the auction
ends. Therefore, it is necessary to detect shill bidders
in real-time and take appropriate actions according to
the fraud activities. This paper presents a real-time
shill bidding detection algorithm to identify the
presence of shill bidding in multiple online auctions.
The algorithm provides each bidder a Live Shill Score
(LSS) indicating the likelihood of their potential
involvement in price inflating behavior. The LSS is
calculated based on the bidding patterns over a live
auction and past bidding history. We have tested our
algorithm on data obtained from a series of realistic
simulated auctions and also commercial online
auctions. Experimental results show that the real-time
detection algorithm is able to prune the search space
required to detect which bidders are likely to be
potential shill bidders.

1. Introduction
An online auction provides ease, comfort and a
convenient trading environment to its users. Therefore,
online auctions are extremely popular for sellers and
buyers. eBay and Yahoo! Auctions are amongst the
most popular online auction sites [10]. In the first
quarter of 2017, ebay alone has 169 million active
users after exceeding 167 million active users by the
end of 2016 [21].
However, despite the overwhelming benefits of
online auctions, they are attractive to fraudsters. Online
auction fraud is one of the fastest growing forms of
Internet-based crime. The U.S. Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3)
reveals that approximately 42 thousand auction-related
fraud complaints were received from June 1, 2014 to

URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10125/50370
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-1-9
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

Jarrod Trevathan
Griffith University, Australia
j.trevathan@griffith.edu.au

December 31, 2014 [22]. Moreover, the latest report of
IC3 has found that auction related complaints are still
ranking at the top of the complaints list with
approximately 116,292 complaints in 2015 [23]. As
participants are anonymous, both sellers and bidders
can be involved in fraudulent activities. One of the
most common types of online auction fraud is shill
bidding.
Shill bidding is the act of introducing false bids into
an auction on behalf of the seller to artificially raise the
item’s price so that legitimate bidders must pay more
in order to win [14, 15]. The presence of shill bidding
also diminishes the reputation of the auction houses as
bidders will be reluctant to participate if they feel there
is the possibility of being ripped-off by a seller. Shill
bidding is difficult to detect because: (i) any user can
register under false identity; and (ii) multiple users can
form a collusive bidding group to evade detection.
Furthermore, it is not easy to prove that someone is
indeed guilty of shill bidding.
Shill bidding detection and prevention mechanisms
have been proposed by researchers [1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11,
15-18]. There is now common consensus of the
common strategies shill bidders behave in. However,
most of these efforts focus on examining bidding
patterns once an auction has terminated – as such an
innocent bidder has already incurred loss as a result of
the shill bidding. More recently, proposals have been
made to detect shill bidding in real-time [3, 10, 12, 13,
20]. The idea being that actions can be taken while an
auction is currently underway in order to warn/deter
shill bidding activity, or prevent the auction from
completing if serious price inflating behavior is being
detected.
This paper proposes a real-time detection algorithm
for shill bidders in multiple auctions. The algorithm
splits a live auction into four time periods and
examines a bidder’s bidding behaviors during each
period. A Live Shill Score (LSS) is calculated for each
bidder during each of these periods based on the
bidding behaviors of the bidder in the live auction and
his/her past bid history. The auctioneer then notifies
legitimate bidders and/or takes necessary actions
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against suspected shill bidders based on the LSS. We
have implemented the algorithm and undertaken
preliminary tests on simulated data and commercial
auction data. Experimental results show that the
algorithm can detect potential shill bidders in multiple
auctions and take necessary actions to them in runtime.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives
a background on real-time shill detection approaches
and the problem motivation for our research; Section 3
presents our proposed LSS algorithm for real-time
detection of shill bidding in multiple auctions; and also
discusses the calculation procedure of LSS for each
bidder during a live auction. Section 4 shows our
experimental setup and preliminary results. Finally
Section 5 provides concluding remarks and avenues for
future work.

2. Background and Problem Motivation
This section describes some existing shill bidding
detection techniques and the motivation of our research
on combating shill bidding fraud in online auctions.

2.1. Related Work
Commercial online auctions (such as eBay) claim
to monitor their auctions for shill bidding. However,
they do not disclose how their shill detection methods
operate, nor do they publicly acknowledge when shill
bidding has been occurring in their auctions. This may
be due to fear of lost business should people learn the
true extent of shill bidding and how much it is costing
legitimate bidders. Furthermore, some unscrupulous
auctioneers might actually benefit from inflated prices
where there is a commission payable based on the final
price.
There are two distinct approaches in scientific
literature on shill bidding detection: (i) Offline (or
static) method which runs after an auction has
terminated, or; (ii) Real-time (or dynamic) method
which operates while an auction is in-progress.
Among the offline approaches, Trevathan and Read
[15] present an algorithm to determine the degree of
shill bidding in online auctions. The algorithm
observes the bidding patterns of each bidder over a
series of auctions held by a specific seller and
calculates a Shill Score for each bidder [15]. The Shill
Score is used to indicate the likelihood of the user
being a potential shill bidder [15]. Bidders can observe
other bidders’ Shill Scores and decide whether they
want to participate in the particular seller’s auction
[15]. However, the algorithm works only when an
auction ends.

Xu et al. [20] analyse some shill bidding patterns
and introduce a Dynamic Auction Model (DAM) to
detect shill bidding in real-time. Their proposed
approach employs three sources: (i) The auction model
which is updated dynamically when new bids arrive;
(ii) Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) formulas represent
the shill bidding patterns; and (iii) A Simple Promela
INterpreter (SPIN) model checker that checks whether
the LTL formulas are violated or not [20].
Nevertheless, the problem of this approach is that
monitoring an auction after every single submitted bid
may make the detection process computationally
intensive, which is not practical when there are a large
number of participants.
In contrast, Ford et al. [3] present a real-time
classifier that identifies suspicious shill bidders based
on a neural network method. The neural network is
initialized with a training sample and is then updated
incrementally to adapt to new bidding data in real-time
[3]. However, manually labelling the large training
dataset of users is inefficient.
Mamun and Sadaoui [10] propose software
architecture to protect auction systems from shill
bidders in online auctions. They claim that their
proposed mechanism keeps the auction system secure
from auction fraud and also maintains trust among
users and the online auction system [10]. However, the
paper continually mentions an IP tracker that tracks the
IP addresses of sellers and bidders. However, the
authors do not actually discuss how to implement IP
tracker for testing the proposed system. Furthermore,
they do not test the effectiveness of their proposal.
Sadaoui et al. [12] propose a generic framework
that covers real-time monitoring of multiple live
auctions. This framework observes the running
auctions, takes actions in real-time and prevents shill
bidders from succeeding [12]. The authors state that
real-time monitoring processes a smaller number of
bids rather than offline processing [12]. This suggests
their proposed system can react quicker to the potential
shill bidders. However, their approach is a combination
of the offline approach with an online approach.
Therefore, claims about the speed of their proposal are
contradictory. Moreover, they do not address collusion
among bidders and/or sellers.
Later Sadaoui et al. [13] propose runtime stagebased monitoring system that detects in-auction fraud
by monitoring each bidder’s stage activities in ongoing
auctions. It then takes immediate action by warning
dishonest bidders and cancelling the suspected auctions
after detecting abnormal activities in ongoing auctions
[13]. However, the authors do not justify the reason for
selecting eight bidding behaviors among 17 proposed
suspicious bidding patterns.
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2.2. Problem Motivation
Considering the limitations of the existing literature
on shill bidding detection, it is necessary to revise the
existing shill detection methods to detect shill bidding
before any payment. This approach will potentially
prevent monetary loss for victims. Moreover, it is
preferable to detect and stop shill bidders from
undertaking shill bidding in the run-time rather than
detect it afterwards.
The research questions we are seeking to address
are as follows:
(i) How will the proposed shill bidding detection
method be able to deter shill bidders in real-time?
(ii) What are the typical shill bidding patterns that can
be used in determining whether shill bidding is
happening in real-time?
(iii) What are the consequences for taking disciplinary
actions against a shill bidder after detecting his/her
involvement in a particular live auction?

3. Methodology
Our shill detection methodology considers bidding
properties while an auction is currently in progress. We
propose a Live Shill Score (LSS) that represents a
bidder’s bidding behavior during a live auction. The
LSS is calculated for each bidder based upon a
selection of bidding behaviors/characteristics and the
bidder’s past bid history. The LSS can be used to
potentially identify shill bidders, and enforce
disciplinary action during an auction.

3.1. Assumptions
To develop our LSS algorithm, we make the
following assumptions:

becomes more unsafe for shill bidders to submit fake
bids closer to the end of an auction as there is an
increased possibility that the shill bidder will win the
auction if he/she is not outbid in time. Therefore, our
proposed LSS algorithm splits an auction into a series
of stages depending on the time elapsed for reacting to
a shill bidder and other legitimate bidders in real-time.
This strategy was first suggested in Xu et al.’s realtime shill detection proposal [20]. The different auction
stages are as follows:
Early Stage – This is the first quarter of the
auction duration (up to 25% of the auction
duration). A shill bidder usually submits bids
early in an auction to encourage legitimate
bidders to enter higher bids in order to win.
(ii) Middle Stage – This is the time period between
25.1% and 80% of the auction duration. A shill
bidder places most of his/her bids in this stage.
(iii) Late Stage – The next 15% (between 80.1% and
95%) of the auction is the late stage. A shill
bidder tries to avoid placing bids during this
period to reduce his/her chance of winning the
auction.
(i)

In our real-time shill bidding detection
methodology, we consider the above stages for
monitoring shill bidding patterns in a live auction.
However, we differ from Xu et. al [19, 20] by
introducing an additional stage, referred to as the Final
stage:
(iv) Final Stage – The last 5% of the auction duration
is used for verifying the detected bidding patterns
from the early, middle and late stages. The overall
LSS of each bidder in the auction will be
calculated during this stage.

(i) There is one shill bidder;
(ii) There are multiple auctions (one live auction and
rest of them are past auctions); and
(iii) There is one seller (note that the seller is not the
same entity as the auctioneer).

The reason for the final stage is that Xu et. al [20]
did not clearly address when reactions would be taken
against the potential shill bidders after the end of the
late stage. Therefore, the final stage is required for
taking appropriate actions against potential shill
bidders after the late stage and for exonerating bidders
with good behavior.

Our proposed algorithm is not addressing situations
where there are concurrent auctions running for the
same item (as in [19]).

3.3. The Real-Time Shill Bidding Detection
Process

3.2. Monitoring Stages of a Live Auction
A shill bidder submits bids at certain times
throughout the auction which can be deliberated more
conducive to price inflating behavior. For instance, it

Figure 1 illustrates the process for real-time shill
bidding detection in multiple auctions. Time flows
from left to right.
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et al. [19, 20], to our knowledge there is no literature
discussing potential penalties or the impact of these
penalties on bidders’ bidding behavior. We propose the
following penalties for our algorithm:
Penalty 1 (At the end of the early stage) – Send
a warning message to the suspected bidders. This
penalty encourages honest bidders to continue
bidding without causing anxiety. A potential shill
bidder would also realize that the auction is being
monitored, thereby forcing him/her to rethink
his/her behavior.
(ii) Penalty 2 (At the end of the middle stage) –
Postpone the auction temporarily; notify all
participating bidders about the suspicious
activity; and also ask suspicious bidders and/or
the seller to show cause for why the auction
should continue. This penalty has a stronger
psychological impact on auction participants. The
penalty sends a message that the auction is
potentially at risk of shill bidding. Therefore,
everyone is on notice to improve their behavior.
At this point, honest bidders can decide whether
they want to remain involved with the auction or
not. On the other hand, the suspicious bidders
and/or seller would realize that they need to
improve their behavior. Otherwise the postponed
auction will not be reopened.
(iii) Penalty 3 (At the end of the late stage) – Stop
the current auction permanently. This penalty also
limits the privileges of the suspicious account
when couple of offences occurred. For example,
feedback rating of a shill bidder can be reduced as
it is an important part of eBay community to
evaluate a seller’s reputation. This penalty
informs honest bidders this is a monitored and
safe bidding system. The suspicious bidders
and/or seller would realize that they need not only
to show their good behavior to run auctions in
future but also to get back good reputation.
Otherwise he/she will not be able to list any
auction further. The penalty reduces the potential
for monetary loss.
(iv) Reward/Penalty 4 (At the end of the final
stage) – Suspend the suspected account
permanently if it shows repeated behaviors in
multiple live auctions. In addition, bidders whose
behavior appears to be normal are exonerated
(i.e., the winner of the auction, late bidders, bid
snipers).
(i)

Figure 1: Real-time shill bidding detection process
in multiple auctions.
A live auction is split into the four aforementioned
stages (i.e., early, middle, late, final). Each bidder’s
behavior is examined against other bids which are
placed by the bidder during each auction stage. We
also consider the bidder’s past bidding history for
calculating each bidder’s LSS. An LSS for each bidder
is calculated during each respective auction stage. The
LSS for each bidder in a particular auction stage is as
follows:
LSSearly – After completing 25% of auction
duration, LSSearly is calculated based on the
bidding behavior of each bidder during the early
stage of the live auction and past bidding history
of the bidder.
(ii) LSSmiddle – The value of LSSmiddle is calculated
after completing the middle stage of the auction
duration. The calculation of LSSmiddle is based on
the bidding behavior of each bidder during the
middle stage of the live auction and past bidding
history of the bidder.
(iii) LSSlate – LSSlate is calculated after completing the
late stage. The calculation of LSSlate is based on
the bidding behavior of each bidder during the
late stage of the live auction and past bidding
history of the bidder.
(iv) LSS – LSS is calculated based on the bidding
behaviors of all bidders throughout the entire
auction and the bidding behavior of the bidders in
past auctions.
(i)

A high value of a bidder’s LSS indicates the
increased likelihood the bidder is engaging in price
inflating behavior. At the end of the auction, a bidder’s
overall LSS is stored into the database.

3.4. Reactions to shill bidders
After every stage of the auction, the algorithm will
determine whether any action is required based on the
bidding behavior so far in the auction. Apart from Xu

In addition, there can be some economic penalties
for the potential shill bidders.
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3.5. Shill bidding behaviors
There are many shill bidding strategies found in
past studies. We identified the seven most popular shill
bidding characteristics based on an analysis of the
literature [9].
Table 1 shows the bidding behaviors with the
corresponding ratings considered for our LSS
algorithm. Among the seven bidding patterns [9],
‘early bidding’ and ‘last/late bidding’ indicate the same
bidding characteristic. Therefore, we consider ‘early
bidding’ in our LSS algorithm.
Table 1: Bidding behavior for real-time detection of
shill bidding
Rating
α
β
γ
δ
ε
ζ

Bidding Behaviors
Affinity to a seller
Bid frequency
Win/lose factor
Rapid outbid time
Small bid increment
Early bidding

Table 2: Bidding behaviors at each auction stage
Stages
Early Stage
Middle Stage
Late Stage

Final Stage

Bidding Behaviors
Affinity to a seller (α rating)
Bid frequency (β rating)
Rapid outbid time (δ rating)
Small bid increment (ε rating)
Early bidding (ζ rating)
Affinity to a seller (α rating)
Bid frequency (β rating)
Win/Lose factor (γ rating)
Rapid outbid time (δ rating)
Small bid increment (ε rating)
Early bidding (ζ rating)

Table 2 shows the bidding behaviors considered at
different stages (i.e., early, middle, late and final stage)
for calculating the LSS of each bidder in a live auction.
The following bidding characteristics are considered
for calculating LSSearly, LSSmiddle, and LSSlate for each
bidder in a live auction:
(i)

Affinity to a seller (α rating) – A shill bidder
usually participates in auctions run by one
particular seller. A bidder with a high α rating is
suspicious to be a shill bidder.
Suppose auctions held by a seller. To calculate
α rating, we count the number of the seller’s
auctions, , bidder has participated in. Then, α
rating of bidder can be calculated as follows:

( − )
=
;
0 ≤
≤1
where
represents the number of auctions
bidder participated in run by a seller and
denotes the number of auctions bidder won. In
general, α rating will be high for a shill bidder.
(ii) Bid frequency (β rating) – β rating indicates the
average percentage of bids that a bidder has
submitted throughout a particular stage of the live
auction and over the past auctions he/she had
participated in.
For calculating the β rating, we count the number
of auctions,
, a bidder has participated in.
Suppose
is the set of auction numbers. The β
, can
rating of bidder across all auctions, ∈
be calculated as follows:
=

1

∈

0,
,

=0

ℎ

;0 ≤

≤1

where
denotes the number of bids placed by
bidder in auction and
is the total number of
bids placed by all bidders in auction . In general,
the β rating will be high for a shill bidder
compared to a legitimate bidder.
(iii) Rapid outbid time (δ rating) – A shill bidder
gives more time to legitimate bidder for
responding on his/her fake bids. Therefore, a shill
bidder submits a new bid within a small time
period of a genuine bid. This behavior denotes δ
rating which can be measured by observing inter
bid times for all bidders. The average inter bid
time is found for each bidder across a particular
stage of the live auction and the past auctions
he/she had participated in. Bidders who wait
longer between bids have a lower average inter
bid time score.
For calculating the δ rating, we count the number
of auctions, , a bidder has participated in.
Suppose
is the set of auction numbers. The δ
rating of bidder across all auctions, ∈
, can
be calculated as follows:
(a) We calculate the inter bidding time for each
bid, !, submitted by bidder in auction :
0,
!=1
∆ ,# = $
−
,
!
> 1, ! ∈ &
,#
,#
where ,#'( is the time of a previous bid
submitted by a rival bidder. Note that, & be
the bid numbers (e.g. 1st bid, 2nd bid, etc) in
auction and )& ) = .
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(b) Then, we calculate the average inter bidding
time for bidder in auction :
(
* = ∑#∈. ∆
+,

,

where & is the bid numbers of bidder in
auction .

So, the final δ rating of any bidder
auctions participated in:
* =1−/

1

∈

* 0;

over all

0 ≤ * ≤1

In general, the * rating will be higher for a shill
bidder in comparison to a legitimate bidder.
(iv) Small bid increment (ε rating) – A shill bidder
outbids a legitimate bid by a large amount will
increase the risk of losing an auction [8].
Therefore, a shill bidder tends to only bid the
minimal amount to stay ahead of the leading bid.
This behavior denotes ε rating which can be
measured by observing inter bid increments for
all bidder. The average inter bid increment is
found for each bidder across a particular stage of
the live auction and the past auctions he/she had
participated in. Bidders who place bids smaller
bid increments have a lower average inter bid
increment score.
For calculating the ε rating, we count the number
of auctions, , a bidder has participated in.
Suppose
is the set of auction numbers. The ε
rating of bidder across all auctions, ∈
, can
be calculated as follows:
(a) We calculate the inter bid increments for
each bid, !, submitted by bidder in auction
:
0,
!=1
∆1 ,# = $
1 ,# − 1 ,# ,
! > 1, ! ∈ &
where 1 ,#'( is the price of a previous bid
submitted by a rival bidder.
(b) Then, we calculate the average inter bid
increment for bidder in auction :
2 =

(

+,

∑#∈. ∆1
,

where & is the bid numbers of bidder in
auction .
So, the final ε rating of any bidder over all
auctions participated in:

2 =1−/

1

∈

2 0;

0 ≤ 2 ≤1

In general, the ε rating will be higher for a shill
bidder in comparison to a legitimate bidder.
(v) Early bidding (ζ rating) – If a shill bidder bids
towards the end of an auction, he/she risks of
losing the auction by not being outbid in time.
Therefore, a shill bidder tries to bid early in an
auction as it is less risky and maximizes the
amount of influence the shill has over an auction.
The ζ rating denotes how early in an auction a
bidder commenced bidding.
To calculate the ζ rating of a bidder , we count
the number of auctions, , the bidder
has
participated in. Suppose
is the set of auction
numbers. The ζ rating of bidder
across all
auctions, ∈
, can be calculated as follows:
We calculate the difference between auction ’s
starting time, , and the time, ,#3 of the first bid
placed by bidder in auction .
4 = ,#3 –

Finally, we calculate the average of the final bid
time differences for bidder over all auctions
participated in:
1
4 =1−
4 ;
0 ≤ 4 ≤1
∈

In general, the ζ rating will be high for a shill
bidder.

We consider the following additional bidding
behavior for calculating the overall LSS at the end of a
live auction:
(vi) Win/lose factor (γ rating) – A shill bidder avoids
wining an auction, as the auction will have to be
repeated. A bidder with a low γ rating indicates
suspicious behavior. It can be mentioned that a
winner of an auction is not a shill bidder. A
bidder who has won
auctions, the γ rating of
the bidder is calculated as follows:
γ =1− 6
7;
0 ≤ γ ≤1
In general, a shill bidder will have a high γ rating.

3.6. Calculation of the LSS
After calculating α, β, δ, ε, ζ, and γ ratings in a
particular stage of auction duration, then we can
calculate the value LSS after completing every stage
(see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: LSS calculation process
899:;<=> =

?@ AB?C DEFGHI B ?J KEFGHI B?L MEFGHI B?N OEFGHI

P 10

In the early stage, LSSearly is calculated as follows:
?@ B ?C B ?J B ?L B ?N

(1)

At the middle stage, LSSmiddle is calculated as follows:
?@ AB ?C DS TTHEB ?J KS TTHEB?L MS TTHE B?N OS TTHE
899Q RR=:
P 10
(2)
?@ B ?C B ?J B ?L B ?N
At the late stage, LSSlate is calculated as follows:
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P 10
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At the final stage, LSS is calculated as follows:
?@ AB ?C DB ?J KB?L MB?N OB ?W X
899
P 10
?@ B ?C B ?J B ?L B?N B ?W

bidders. That is, if a bidder only bids once at any stages
of a live auction, submitting the bid quickly just after
the current highest bid and by minimal amount
required, then the bidder will have high * and 2
ratings. As the bidder does not bid again, his/her * and
2 ratings will always remain high and not average
down if the bidder submits slower and larger bids later.
Therefore, the weightings of * and 2 highly results in
many one-time bidders scoring high overall even
though such bidders are clearly innocent.
A bidder’s ζ weightings are also given two as it is
not more influential than other bidding behavior
ratings. Instead all the bidding characteristic
weightings must be examined as a group to determine
if the bidder’s bidding behavior fits the profile of a
shill bidder.
The LSS values in all stages of a live auction are
between 0 and 10. The bidder with the highest LSS is
the most likely to be a potential shill bidder.

(4)

where Y is the weighted coefficient associated with
each rating in Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4). The
weights used in this paper are: Y( = 9, YZ = 2, Y[ = 2, Y\
= 2, Y] = 2, and Y^ = 5. These weightings are obtained
by experimenting with simulated auction data and also
by looking at historical commercial auction data. Note
that it is difficult to calibrate weightings from known
auctions that contain shill bidding as such data is
extremely limited (due to non-disclosure by
commercial auctioneers). We chose the weightings
using the following justifications:
A bidder’s rating receives the highest weighting.
This is done to count one-time bidders who participate
most of auctions run by a particular seller and always
submitted bid in the early and middle stages of an
auction.
A bidder’s _ rating is given the next highest
weighting because it is the strongest sign that the
winner of the auction is not a shill bidder.
The next significant factors are the β, δ, ε, ζ ratings.
These factors are used to see if the bidding behavior
matches a shill bidder’s behavior. A bidder’s rating
will be high for an aggressive shill bidder or low for
one-time bidder. It may happen that a one-time bidder
submits bid most of the auctions either early or middle
stage of the auction duration. As a result, the rating
can present mixed results depending on the type of
shill behavior employed. For this reason, the
rating
is given a lower weighting to consider both type of
bidders.
The * and 2 weightings receive lower rating than
and _ weightings because of the effect of one-time

4. Experimental Results
The LSS algorithm was tested on simulated and
commercial auction data. The first test involved a
series of simulated auction trials which were acquired
from Trevathan and Read [15]. The second test
considered commercial online auctions which were
collected from Jank and Shmueli [6].

4.1. Simulated auctions
Trevathan and Read [15] conducted a series of
simulated auction trails to obtain auction data. The data
contained thirty-nine auctions where each of these
auctions was for a different item. All auctions were
considered to be for one seller [15].
The auction proceedings involved twenty-six
bidders. A bidder’s goal was to win while also trying to
save his/her money. On the other hand, a shill bidder’s
goal was to force a bidder into spending as much of
his/her money as possible. Bidders were not informed
that shill bidding was occurring. Furthermore, the shill
bidder had no knowledge of how much money bidders
had.
There were two types of tests performed: (i) with
one shill bidder, and; (ii) without shill bidding. The
LSS algorithm was run on all of the tests to determine
its effectiveness on determining shill bidder and the
likelihood of it incriminating innocent bidders. Each
bidder’s LSS was compared to a predetermined
threshold value for a known shill bidder. The threshold
values were different at four different stages of a live
auction. For example, `UEFGHI for the early stage,
`US TTHE for the middle stage, `UHFVE for the late stage,
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and `Ua bFH for the final stage. To experiment LSS
algorithm on simulated auction data, we consider
`UEFGHI 9, `US TTHE 8, `UHFVE 8, and `Ua bFH 7.
These values were obtained by experimenting with
simulated and commercial auction data.
Earlier
auction stages have higher thresholds to ensure that
innocent bidders do not incur penalties due to the lack
of evidence.

Table 4: LSS of each bidder in the different stages
of Auction ID- 9

4.1.1. Auctions with shill bidding. The first test
involved ten auctions and sixteen bidders, including
one shill bidder (i.e., ‘Shelly’). Table 3 presents the
Shill Scores for each bidder at the end of the auction
(as outlined in [15]). Table 3 shows that ‘Shelly’ is
identified as engaging in the most significant price
inflating behavior (i.e., ‘Shelly’ has a Shill Score of
9.16).
Table 3: Shill Scores for each bidder using
Trevathan and Read approach [15]

Figure 3: LSS of each bidder participated in
Auction ID- 9

Although Trevathan and Read’s approach [15] was
able to detect a potential shill bidder, their Shill Score
algorithm does not work in real-time. Therefore, we
chose to run our LSS algorithm on the same auction
data to see how it would execute in detecting a shill
bidder in real-time.
To experiment with the LSS algorithm, we
considered one live auction (i.e., Auction ID- 9) among
the ten auctions and remaining nine auctions were
considered as past auctions. Table 4 shows the LSS of
each bidder from Auction ID- 9. ‘Shelly’ showed shill
bidding behavior in each stage of the auction duration
(i.e., consistently high scores (Figure 3)). This results
in the LSS algorithm postponing the auction after the
middle stage due to generating Penalty 2. ‘Shelly’ is
then put on notice before the auction resumes.
Therefore, the LSS takes actions against a potential
shill bidder earlier as compared to [15].

4.1.2. Auctions without shill bidding. The second
test involved ten auctions held by a seller. There were
18 bidders. To experiment our LSS algorithm, we
considered one live auction and rest of ten auctions as
past auctions. However, unlike the previous test no
intentional shill bidding behavior had been engaged in.
Table 5 and Figure 4 show the LSS of each bidder
in Auction ID- 8. The test’s purpose is to gauge regular
bidding behavior in the different stages of a live
auction. Scores are consistently low for all bidders;
therefore no real-time intervention is required.
Table 5: LSS of each bidder in the different stages
of Auction ID- 8
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Figure 4: LSS of each bidder in Auction ID- 8

4.2. Commercial auctions
The LSS algorithm was tested on commercial
auction data. We considered an auction listing of Palm
Pilot PDAs auctioned on eBay [6]. We selected the
PDA because of its popularity. The auction data was
collected over a period of two months in 2003. The
auction data contains 149 auctions across multiple
sellers.
We considered one auction as live (i.e., Auction ID3023885982 run by ‘michael-33’) among 149 auctions
and the rest of them were past auctions. To experiment
the LSS algorithm on commercial auction data, we
consider `UEFGHI 6, `US TTHE 6, `UHFVE 6, and
`Ua bFH 6. These values were obtained by
experimenting with commercial auction data.
Table 6 shows the LSS of each bidder in Auction
ID- 3023885982. Figure 5 illustrates that ‘chimam’
showed consistent shill behavior (i.e., scores above 6).
The LSS algorithm triggers Penalties 1 and 2 as a
result. Therefore, the LSS algorithm starts intervening
in the auction at the end of the early and middle stages.
This intervention could potentially prevent further bad
behavior from this bidder.
Table 6: LSS of each bidder in the different stages
of Auction ID- 3023885982

Figure 5: LSS of each bidder in Auction ID3023885982
On further inspection, ‘chimam’ has participated in
75% of total auctions run by the same seller (i.e.,
‘micahel-33’) which is suspicious (see Table 6).

5. Conclusion and Future Work
This paper proposed a real-time detection method
for combating shill bidding in multiple online auctions.
Our LSS algorithm aims to not only detect potential
shill bidders in real-time but also to react to the shill
bidding behavior as early as possible during a live
auction. Therefore, this approach potentially reduces
the monetary loss of shill bidding victims.
We implemented the LSS algorithm and undertook
some experimentation to determine how effective the
algorithm is in detecting shill bidders in run-time. The
first tests involved simulated auction data (i.e., real
users with fake auctions). These tests contained data
for known shill bidding and also auctions with no shill
bidding. The results show that the LSS was able to
highlight a potential shill bidder during a live auction.
Further testing involved using commercial auction
data collected from eBay. It was not known whether
this data contained any shill bidders. The results for
the LSS algorithm were consistent with the simulated
auction data. The algorithm was able to identify a
highly suspicious bidder in run-time.
Future work involves undertaking more comprehensive
testing of the LSS algorithm in multiple auctions run by
multiple sellers using a wider range of auction data.
Additionally, we would also like to further develop our
auction system for detecting and preventing multiple
shill bidders from performing price inflating attempts
with collusive groups in real-time. Further work also
involves looking into the impact of imposing penalties
on bidders and extending our proposal to look at
concurrent auctions for the same item.
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